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Abstract
This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols
that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These
protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001),
allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate
and form coalitions. The self-duality of the Shapley value plays a key role in the second
and third results. Moreover, these renegotiation protocols allow an actual play along the
equilibrium path to restore the Shapley value in case of a ‘mistake’ made before.
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1 Introduction
Almost at the same time when the two fundamental solution concepts for game theory,
Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950a)) and Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950b)), were es-
tablished, John Nash (1953) pointed out the importance and necessity of using both ax-
iomatic and strategic approaches to bridge the gap between its non-cooperative side and
cooperative side. A comprehensive survey on this research agenda, called Nash program,
is provided by Serrano (2005), and broadly for implementation theory, we refer to Jackson
(2001). Discussions on this program in relation to mechanism design theory can be found
in Trockel (2002).1 In his presidential address to the Econometric Society, Maskin (2003)
outlined coalitions and externalities as core topics for game theory in the coming years and
highlighted adopting both axiomatic and strategic approaches, which was reiterated in his
talk at the Nobel Panel meeting of the 2008 Games Congress in Chicago.
Although the Shapley value, a major solution concept for cooperative games, was in-
vented in the same period (Shapley (1953)) along the work of Nash, it was not until over
thirty years later that the ﬁrst non-cooperative study on this solution concept was pro-
posed: a bilateral bargaining procedure by Gul (1989, 1999). Hart and Mas-Collel (1996)
constructed a multilateral bargaining procedure to obtain the Shapley value. This proce-
dure is further studied in Krishna and Serrano (1995). By endogenizing the selection of
a proposer, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) developed the multi-bidding mechanism
(Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002)) that yields the Shapley value in actual terms. Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) also oﬀered an extensive discussion of the non-cooperative
study on the Shapley value.
The current research contributes to the non-cooperative study of the multilateral coali-
tional bargaining in two main aspects.
Firstly, the option for rejected players to have chance to form a coalition again and
then renegotiate with existing players is modeled and analyzed. So far in the literature
most bargaining protocols for the Shapley value require a rejected proposer to simply leave
the game and stand alone, i.e., losing all the possibilities of forming coalitions with anyone
else. This contradicts our real life observation that those who are excluded from a party (or
a certain organization) may well organize into a new party, and even further renegotiate
with the old party for potential greater beneﬁts. Such a possibility seems necessary to
explore. Based on the original multi-bidding mechanism proposed by Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001), we construct three non-cooperative bargaining protocols to study the
option of renegotiation.
1It is worthwhile to note an interesting research by Sun, Trockel and Yang (2008) that adds coali-
tion formation issue into the broad Nash program, where a cooperative solution concept is supported by
competitive outcomes of a decentralized production economy.
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These renegotiation bargaining protocols not only seem realistic, but also lead to actual
plays on equilibrium paths. Unlike most bargaining procedures in the literature that only
obtain the Shapley value at the ﬁrst stage in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), the
renegotiation protocols introduced in the paper allow players to actually go through the
following stages and still realize the Shapley value.
Secondly, the paper oﬀers a robustness study of the Shapley value in non-cooperative
bargaining with diﬀerent renegotiation protocols. Ju and Wettstein (2009) proposes a
generalized bidding mechanism and shows that by introducing a renegotiation stage2 a
bargaining game may generate completely diﬀerent value allocations in equilibrium. The
three renegotiation protocols presented in this paper restore the Shapley value in SPE,
despite the expanded options in bargaining, which provide additional support to this major
cooperative solution concept.
In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the self-duality of the Shapley value, a de-
sired axiomatic property but under-explored in the literature of Nash program, plays an
important role in the proofs of this study. Hence, the non-cooperative approach further
enhances our understanding of the cooperative side of the Shapley value.
The next section provides the preliminaries. In Section 3 we construct the three dis-
tinctive non-cooperative bargaining protocols with renegotiation and show that they all
yield the Shapley value in SPE. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The cooperative model and the Shapley value
We denote by N = {1, ..., n} the set of players, and by S ⊆ N a coalition of players. A
transferable utility (TU) game in characteristic form is denoted by (N, v) where v : 2N → R
is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. The class of all TU games with player set
N is denoted by TUN . Throughout the paper, |S| denotes the cardinality of S, and for
simplicity we use |S| = s. When no confusion arises, let |N | = n. For a coalition S, v(S)
is the total payoﬀ that the members in S can obtain if S forms. For notational simplicity,
given i ∈ N , we use v(i) instead of v({i}) to denote the stand-alone payoﬀ of player i. A
value is a mapping f which associates with every game (N, v) a vector in RN . A value
determines the payoﬀs for every player in the game.
Given a cooperative game (N, v) and a subset S ⊆ N , we deﬁne the subgame (S, v|S)
by assigning the value v|S(T ) ≡ v(T ) for any T ⊆ S.
2That renegotiation is restricted for each rejected player and the existing agreed coalition only, but does
not allow rejected players to form coalition by themselves, whereas it is permissible in the current paper.
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We denote by ϕ the Shapley value for game (N, v) which is deﬁned by
ϕi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]
for all i ∈ N . It is the unique value that satisﬁes eﬃciency, additivity, symmetry and the
null player property.
Moreover, it is well-known that the Shapley value is self-dual (cf. Kalai and Samet
(1987)). Given a game v ∈ TUN , its dual game (N, vd) is deﬁned by vd(S) = v(N)−v(N\S)
for all S ⊆ N . A solution concept f satisﬁes self-duality if f(v) = f(vd) for every v ∈ TUN .
3 The renegotiation mechanisms
In this section, we construct three diﬀerent bargaining protocols with the option of rene-
gotiation and show that all of them yield the Shapley value as the unique SPE outcome.
Although these three mechanisms are diﬀerent in the speciﬁc renegotiation design, they
share the same basic structure, which can be described brieﬂy and informally as follows.
Players ﬁrstly participate in a bidding stage a la Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)
to choose a proposer.3 At the next stage the proposer oﬀers a vector of payments to all
other players in exchange for joining her to form the grand coalition. This is equivalent to
saying that the proposer makes a scheme showing how to split v(N) among all the players.
At stage 3, all the other players sequentially decide to agree or reject the oﬀer. The oﬀer
is accepted if all players accept it, and is rejected if at least one player rejects. In case of
acceptance the grand coalition forms and the proposer receives v(N) out of which she pays
out the oﬀers made. In case of rejection this (rejected) proposer ‘waits’ (instead of getting
her stand-alone payoﬀ) while all the other players go again through the same game.
We now investigate the possibility that the rejected proposers can further bargain
among themselves to form a coalition, following which they may be able to renegotiate
with the ‘incumbent’ players, to obtain what we term the renegotiation mechanisms.
Inspired by the real world cases such as a rejected party leader can form a new party
with his followers, or a departed founding member of a company may establish a new
ﬁrm by hiring some staﬀ from the former company, we construct the ﬁrst renegotiation
mechanism. It speciﬁes that the ﬁrst rejected proposer has power to unite all rejected
proposers and then renegotiate with the incumbent players. The second renegotiation
mechanism is a natural variant, which has the incumbent player make a renegotiation
oﬀer to the ﬁrst rejected proposer. The third mechanism is more ﬂexible. Rather than
3As can be seen from the following analysis, the reason we build the renegotiation bargaining protocols
on this bidding stage is that it helps to endogenously select representatives of incumbent players, which
facilitates the renegotiation in a natural way.
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having the ﬁrst rejected proposer have power to unite all rejected proposers, it allows every
proposer, when rejected, to be able to bargain and form a coalition with the immediately
preceding rejected proposer.
As for how these three mechanisms precisely proceed and diﬀer in the respective rene-
gotiation stages, we refer to the following formal descriptions.
Mechanism A. If there is only one player {i}, she simply receives v(i). When the player
set N = {1, . . . , n} consists of two or more players, the mechanism is deﬁned recursively.
Stages 1 to 3 provide for any set of (active) players S a proposer in S, chosen via a bidding
procedure (stage 1), an oﬀer made by the proposer to the rest of the players in S (stage 2)
who then accept or reject (stage 3). If stage 3 ends with a rejection, all players in S other
than the rejected proposer proceed again through stages 1 to 3 where the set of active
players is reduced by excluding the rejected proposer. If stage 3 ends with acceptance, for
S = N the game ends; but for a coalition S smaller than N , the game moves to stage 4.
At stage 4, all previously rejected proposers, i.e., the inactive players N\S, have one more
chance to organize themselves. The earliest rejected proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer to every other player in N\S. If this oﬀer is rejected, then the game ends with players
in N\S receiving their stand-alone payoﬀs. If the oﬀer is accepted, then the game proceeds
to stage 5, where the earliest rejected proposer, as now the representative of N\S, makes
a ‘renegotiation’ oﬀer to the proposer of S. If this renegotiation oﬀer is accepted, then S
and N\S merge into the grand coalition and the game ends; otherwise, the game stops
such that the two sides stay split.
The mechanism starts with S = N .
Stage 1: Each player i ∈ S makes s−1 bids bij ∈ R with j ∈ S\{i}. For each i ∈ S, deﬁne
the net bid of player i by Bi =
∑
j∈S\{i} b
i
j −
∑
j∈S\{i} b
j
i . The net bids are used to
measure players’ willingness to become the proposer. Let is = argmaxi∈S(B
i) where
in case of a non-unique maximizer we choose any of these maximal bidders to be the
‘winner’ with equal probability. Once the winner is has been chosen, player is pays
every player j ∈ S\{is} her bid bisj .
Stage 2: Player is makes a vector of oﬀers x
is
j ∈ R to every player j ∈ S\{is}. (This oﬀer
is additional to the bids paid at stage 1.)
Stage 3: The players in S other than is, sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer. If at
least one player rejects it, then the oﬀer is rejected. Otherwise, the oﬀer is accepted.
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If the oﬀer made at stage 2 is rejected, all players in S other than is proceed again
through the mechanism from stage 1 where the set of active players is S\{is}.4
Meanwhile, player is, together with all previously rejected proposers N\S, waits for
the negotiation outcome of S\{is}.
If the oﬀer of is is accepted, we have to distinguish between two cases where S = N
and S ̸= N . In the case where S = N , which means that all players agree with the
proposer on the scheme of sharing v(N), the game ENDS. Then, the ﬁnal payoﬀ to
player j ̸= in is xinj +binj while player in receives v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{in} x
in
j −
∑
j∈N\{in} b
in
j .
In the case where S ̸= N , the game moves to stage 4.
Stage 4: The ﬁrst rejected proposer in proposes a vector of take-it-or-leave-it payments
yinik ∈ R to every rejected proposer ik where k = s+1, ..., n−1. These players, sequen-
tially, either accept or reject the proposal. Again, acceptance requires unanimity.
If the proposal is rejected, then the game ends with all rejected proposers in N\S
standing alone. Thus, is ﬁnally receives v(S)−
∑
j∈S\{is} b
is
j −
∑
j∈S\{is} x
is
j +
∑n
k=s+1 b
ik
is
,
each player j ∈ S\{is} ﬁnally receives
∑n
k=s b
ik
j + x
is
j , and each player ik for k =
s+ 1, ..., n ﬁnally receives v(ik)−
∑
j∈N\{ik,ik+1,...,in} b
ik
j +
∑
l∈{ik+1,...,in} b
l
ik
.
If the proposal is accepted, then in pays the oﬀer y
in
ik
∈ R to every player ik where
k = s + 1, ..., n − 1, and the coalition N\S is formed, of which in becomes the
representative. The game proceeds to stage 5.
Stage 5: Player in makes a renegotiation oﬀer z
in
is
∈ R to is who is the representative of
S.
If the renegotiation oﬀer is rejected by is, then the game ends with both sides, S and
N\S, staying apart. Thus, is ﬁnally receives v(S) −
∑
j∈S\{is} b
is
j −
∑
j∈S\{is} x
is
j +∑n
k=s+1 b
ik
is
, each player j ∈ S\{is} ﬁnally receives
∑n
k=s b
ik
j + x
is
j , while in ﬁnally
receives v(N\S)−∑j∈N\{in} binj −∑n−1k=s+1 yinik and each player ik for k = s+1, ..., n−1
ﬁnally receives yinik −
∑
j∈N\{ik,ik+1,...,in} b
ik
j +
∑
l∈{ik+1,...,in} b
l
ik
.
If is accepts the renegotiation oﬀer, then in pays z
in
is
to is so that the grand coalition
N is formed. Hence, the game ends and is ﬁnally receives z
in
is
− ∑j∈S\{is} bisj −∑
j∈S\{is} x
is
j +
∑n
k=s+1 b
ik
is
, each player j ∈ S\{is} ﬁnally receives
∑n
k=s b
ik
j + x
is
j ,
while in ﬁnally receives v(N) − zinis −
∑
j∈N\{in} b
in
j −
∑n−1
k=s+1 y
in
ik
and each player ik
for k = s+ 1, ..., n− 1 ﬁnally receives yinik −
∑
j∈N\{ik,ik+1,...,in} b
ik
j +
∑
l∈{ik+1,...,in} b
l
ik
.
4To make it clearer, here we explicitly explain the amount of payoﬀ that players in S\{is} will bargain
for, although it is incorporated in the description of the following stages provided below. Because of the
chance of renegotiation at stages 4 and 5, players in S\{is} bid for becoming the proposer is−1 so as to
win the oﬀer zinis−1 made by in at stage 5. In equilibrium, it equals v(S\{is}).
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We note that in the case the mechanism reaches the situation where the set of active play-
ers consists of one player only, i.e., |S| = 1, the corresponding stages 1 to 3 are redundant
and this single player is considered as the proposer for herself whose oﬀer is accepted im-
mediately and the game continues to stage 4.
The idea of having the ﬁrst rejected proposer making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to all
other rejected players is consistent with many real world observations. After a CEO quits
a company, his followers may go with him, and then he may set up a competing ﬁrm with
these colleagues. And it is not rare that these two ﬁrms could well merge some time later.
Similar stories apply to political parties and their leaders.
We will show that for any (strictly) superadditive5 game (N, v) (i.e., v(S ∪ T ) >
v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅ ), all SPE of Mechanism A yield the same
outcome, which coincides with the payoﬀ vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley value.
Theorem 3.1 For any superadditive game (N, v), the subgame perfect equilibrium out-
comes of Mechanism A coincide with the payoﬀ vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley
value.
To facilitate the understanding of the result, we sketch a key reasoning that underlies
the feature of the mechanism. One readily sees that, among rejected proposers, only in can
potentially get extra payoﬀ beyond her stand-alone payoﬀ, due to the right to propose to
all the rejected players at stage 4. In SPE, she will oﬀer the stand-alone payoﬀs to these
players. Anticipating this, any subsequent proposer would not make an oﬀer that will be
rejected: by superadditivity, we know that making an oﬀer that will be accepted results
in a higher payoﬀ to the proposer than his stand-alone payoﬀ, the SPE outcome if being
rejected. Hence, reasoning further backward, the ﬁrst proposer in, if her oﬀer is rejected,
will actually end up with her stand-alone payoﬀ. Consequently, despite a potential advan-
tage of gaining a big surplus by making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to those who got rejected
after her, it is impossible (because everyone else is smart) for the ﬁrst rejected proposer to
substantiate it. With this in mind and due to superadditivity, in equilibrium, in will also
make an oﬀer that is accepted by all players in N\{in}.
Proof (of Theorem 3.1)
Let (N, v) be a superadditive game. Before showing that every SPE yields the payoﬀ vector
ϕ(N, v), we ﬁrst show that the Shapley value is an SPE outcome by explicitly constructing
5A weaker condition called strict zero-monotonicity (i.e., v(S) > v(S\{i}) + v({i}) for all S ⊆ N and
i ∈ S) is suﬃcient for Theorem 3.1. We use superadditivity here to be consistent in presenting all the
results as it is required for Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4.
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such an SPE. Consider the following strategies (we describe it for the active set of players,
S):
At stage 1, each player i ∈ S announces bij = ϕj(S, v|S) − ϕj(S\{i}, v|S\{i}) for every
j ∈ S\{i}.
At stage 2, a proposer, player is, oﬀers x
is
j = ϕj(S\{is}, v|S\{is}) to every j ∈ S\{is}.
At stage 3, any player j ∈ S\{is} accepts any oﬀer which is greater than or equal to
ϕj(S\{is}, v|S\{is}) and rejects any oﬀer strictly less than ϕj(S\{is}, v|S\{is}).
At stage 4, the ﬁrst rejected proposer in makes an oﬀer y
in
ik
= v({ik}) to any subse-
quently rejected proposer ik where k = s+1, ..., n−1. And any ik, where k = s+1, ..., n−1,
accepts an oﬀer yinik ≥ v({ik}) and rejects it otherwise.
At stage 5, as the representative of N\S, in oﬀers zinis = v(S) to is, while is accepts
any oﬀer greater than or equal to v(S) and rejects any oﬀer strictly less than it.
Clearly the combination of these strategies of all players in N leads to acceptance at stage
3, which yields the Shapley value for any player who is not the proposer. Moreover, given
that following the strategies the oﬀer is accepted by all players and the grand coalition is
formed, the proposer also obtains her Shapley value.
With the reasoning for stages 4 and 5 provided immediately before the proof, one can
readily verify the above strategies are indeed best responses by superadditivity. To show
that the strategies of the active players at stages 1, 2 and 3 are on a subgame perfect
equilibrium path, we proceed by induction. The induction hypothesis is that whenever the
game reaches a round with s active players comprising the set S, then in any SPE of the
game induced by Mechanism A, each player j ∈ S obtains ϕj(S, v|S). To see this induction
assumption holds for s = 1, note that when s = 1, the ‘oﬀer’ (that is made by i1 to himself)
is vacuously accepted. Thus, the payoﬀ to i1 is v({i1}), which is indeed ϕi1({i1}, v|{i1}).
We now assume it holds for any set of s active players, where 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, and then
show that it holds for any set of s+ 1 active players.
To show that for an arbitrary set of s + 1 active players, say S ∪ {is+1}, each player
j ∈ S ∪ {is+1} obtains ϕj(S ∪ {is+1}, v|S∪{is+1}) in SPE, please note the following: the
strategies of active players at stage 3 are on an SPE path by the induction assumption;
the strategy of the proposer at stage 2 is on an SPE path for a proposer that wishes to
make an acceptable oﬀer. More speciﬁcally, the reason that any proposer, other than the
ﬁrst rejected proposer in, would like to make an acceptable oﬀer is superadditivity. Con-
sequently, by backward induction, in can foresee that he can never obtain a higher payoﬀ
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than v(N) − v(N\{in}) in SPE. Hence, making an acceptable oﬀer by the ﬁrst proposer
is part of an SPE. Finally, to check that the actions at stage 1, i.e., the bids, complete
an SPE, note that all net bids equal zero by the balanced contributions property for the
Shapley value (Myerson (1980)). Any deviation in the bids made by a player i cannot
increase that player’s payoﬀ: lowering her total bids makes another player become the
proposer, this will not change her payoﬀ as all other players still bid the same way; raising
her total bids can only lower her ﬁnal payoﬀ; maintaining the same level of her total bids
does not improve her payoﬀ.
The proof that any SPE yields the Shapley value involves induction as well. Although the
induction hypothesis is essentially the same as the above one, we slightly modify it for the
convenience of presentation. Here, the induction assumption is that whenever the game
reaches a round with s active players comprising the set S, then in any SPE of the game
induced by Mechanism A, each player j ∈ S obtains ϕj(S, v|S). This induction assumption
apparently holds for s = 1. We now assume it holds for any set of s − 1 active players,
where 2 ≤ s ≤ n, and then show that it holds for any set of s active players by a series of
claims. Please note that since this proof proceeds along similar lines as the unicity proof
of Theorem 1 in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), we will omit its details. But for
completeness, below we present these claims and provide some key explanations.
Claim (1). In any SPE at stage 5, in oﬀers z
in
is
= v(S) to is, and is accepts any renegotia-
tion oﬀer zinis ≥ v(S) but rejects any zinis < v(S).
Claim (2). In any SPE at stage 4, in oﬀers y
in
ik
= v({ik}) to any subsequently rejected
proposer ik where k = s+ 1, ..., n− 1. And any ik, where k = s+ 1, ..., n− 1, accepts any
oﬀer yinik ≥ v({ik}) and rejects it otherwise.
Claim (3). In any SPE at stage 3, any player j ∈ S\{is} accepts any oﬀer which
is greater than or equal to ϕj(S\{is}, v|S\{is}) and rejects any oﬀer strictly less than
ϕj(S\{is}, v|S\{is}).
One can readily see that claims (1) and (2) follow directly from superadditivity, while claim
(3) is due to the induction assumption.
Claim (4). In any SPE at stage 2, a proposer is, where 2 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, oﬀers xisj =
ϕj(S\{is}, v|S\{is}) to every j ∈ S\{is}; and in may have two diﬀerent strategies: one
is to oﬀer xinj = ϕj(N\{in}, v|N\{in}) to every j ∈ N\{in}, and the other is to oﬀer
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xinj < ϕj(N\{in}, v|N\{in}) to some j ∈ N\{in}.
It is easy to see this is the best response for any subsequent proposer after in due to su-
peradditivity, because any lower oﬀer would be rejected, which results in the stand-alone
payoﬀ to him by claim (2). However, for the ﬁrst proposer, in, it is still part of an SPE
strategy to make an unacceptable oﬀer at stage 2, so long as later at the renegotiation
stage, he oﬀers zinin−1 = v(N\{in}), which will result in the same payoﬀ to in as in the case
where he makes an acceptable oﬀer at stage 2.
Claim (5). In any SPE, Bi = Bj for all i, j ∈ N and hence Bi = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Claim (6). In any SPE, each player’s payoﬀ is the same regardless of who is chosen as the
proposer.
Claim (7). In any SPE, the ﬁnal payoﬀ received by each player coincides with each player’s
Shapley value.
The proofs of claims (5), (6) and (7) can be constructed in the same way as in Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). 2
Please note that in the above mechanism, even if the strict superadditivity is imposed,
the SPE strategies are not unique, which is diﬀerent from that of Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001). The ﬂexibility of multiple SPE comes from the option of renegotiation.
Contrasting with the SPE involving immediate acceptance by every j ∈ N\{in} at stage
3, a diﬀerent SPE allows in to make an unacceptable oﬀer (e.g., x
in
j < ϕj(N\{in}, v|N\{in})
to some j ∈ N\{in}) at stage 2 but later, at the renegotiation stage, to oﬀer zinin−1 =
v(N\{in}), which restores the Shapley value outcome for every player.
We have seen that Mechanism A speciﬁes a rule that at stage 5 it is the ﬁrst rejected
proposer, in, now as the representative of N\S, who has the power to make an oﬀer to is in
renegotiation. In equilibrium obviously in will oﬀer v(S) to is, which makes stages 4 and 5
strategically redundant in generating the Shapley value beyond stage 3. Is this rule really
necessary to obtain the Shapley value if we adopt such a renegotiation design? Alterna-
tively, will a rule having the accepted proposer, is, now as the representative of S, make an
oﬀer to in in renegotiation lead to a diﬀerent outcome from the Shapley value? Surprisingly,
the Shapley value is robust to such a change-in-power in the bargaining with renegotiation.
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Mechanism B. The mechanism is identical structure-wise to Mechanism A. Stages 1, 2, 3
and 4 are in eﬀect the same as in Mechanism A. The description below is restricted to
stage 5, where the diﬀerence with Mechanism A lies.
Stage 5: Player is makes a renegotiation oﬀer z
is
in
∈ R to in who represents N\S.
If the renegotiation oﬀer is rejected, then the game ends with both sides, S and N\S,
staying apart. Thus, the payoﬀ to each player is still the same as speciﬁed in the
corresponding part of Mechanism A.
If the renegotiation oﬀer is accepted, then is pays z
is
in
to in so that the grand coalition
N is formed. Hence, the game ends and is ﬁnally receives v(N)−zisin−
∑
j∈S\{is} b
is
j −∑
j∈S\{is} x
is
j +
∑n
k=s+1 b
ik
is
, each player j ∈ S\{is} ﬁnally receives
∑n
k=s b
ik
j + x
is
j ,
while in ﬁnally receives z
is
in
− zinis −
∑
j∈N\{in} b
in
j −
∑n−1
k=s+1 y
in
ik
and each player ik for
k = s+ 1, ..., n− 1 ﬁnally receives yinik −
∑
j∈N\{ik,ik+1,...,in} b
ik
j +
∑
l∈{ik+1,...,in} b
l
ik
.
Theorem 3.2 For any superadditive game (N, v), the SPE outcomes of Mechanism B
coincide with the payoﬀ vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley value.
Proof
The proof relies on the self-duality satisﬁed by the Shapley value. Due to superadditivity,
at stage 5, the best response for is is to oﬀer z
is
in
= v(N\S) to in. Hence, in equilibrium,
the amount of payoﬀ that players in S bargain for equals v(N)− v(N\S) instead of v(S)
that was the case in Mechanism A. The proof thus proceeds as in that of Theorem 3.1,
with the underlying characteristic function, describing the payoﬀ to coalition S, given by
vd(S) = v(N) − v(N\S) (rather than v(S)). We know that (N, vd) is the dual game of
(N, v) and the Shapley value is self-dual, i.e., ϕ(v) = ϕ(vd). 2
Comparing the above two renegotiation mechanisms, one may consider a compromised
version (call the compromised mechanism) such that is and in bid for the right to make
the renegotiation oﬀer at stage 5. This will endogenize the selection of a proposer in
renegotiation. Given Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we immediately obtain the following
result.
Corollary 3.3 For any superadditive game (N, v), the SPE outcomes of the compromised
mechanism coincide with the payoﬀ vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley value.
The renegotiation mechanisms constructed so far require all the rejected proposers to
wait until an active set of players S form into a coalition. Only by then will in be able to
make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to all other rejected players to form a coalition N\S and
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can the game proceed to the renegotiation stage between S and N\S. Now we consider a
protocol such that the rejected proposers can form coalitions among themselves timely with
no need to wait up to the moment S is formed. That is, soon after a proposer is rejected,
he can make an oﬀer to the proposer got rejected immediately before him. This mechanism
seems even more realistic and practical especially when concerning the short time span and
distance between the adjacent rejections and the neighboring rejected proposers. It is in-
teresting that again the Shapley value emerges as the only SPE outcome of this mechanism.
Mechanism C. Stages 1 and 2 are the same as in Mechanism A. The description is,
therefore, only focused on those diﬀerences appearing at stages 3, 4 and 5.
Stage 3: The players in S other than is, sequentially, either accept or reject the oﬀer.
If the oﬀer made at stage 3 is rejected, all players in S other than is proceed again
through the mechanism from stage 1. Meanwhile, the rejected proposer is continues
playing the game at stage 4.
If the oﬀer of is is accepted, we have two cases where S = N and S ̸= N . If S = N ,
the game ends like in Mechanism A. If S ̸= N , the game moves to stage 5a.
Stage 4: The rejected proposer is makes an oﬀer y
is
is+1
∈ R to the previously rejected
proposer is+1.
If the proposal is rejected by is+1, then is enters stage 5b by himself, whereas the ﬁnal
payoﬀ to any player ik where k = s+1, ..., n is conﬁrmed because he will not engage
in any further negotiation. Note that ik may have already formed with other rejected
proposers into a coalition denoted by T ik (if ik stands alone, T
ik = {ik}), then this
player ik ﬁnally receives v(T
ik)− yikik+1 −
∑
j∈N\{ik,ik+1,...,in} b
ik
j +
∑
l∈{ik+1,...,in} b
l
ik
.
If the proposal is accepted by is+1, then is pays the oﬀer y
is
is+1
∈ R to is+1. Note that
if before accepting the oﬀer from is, is+1 has already formed a coalition with other
rejected proposers, say T is+1 , then a larger coalition T is+1 ∪{is} is established and is
becomes its representative. The game proceeds to stage 5b.
Stage 5a: Player is, as a representative of S, makes a renegotiation oﬀer z
is
is+1
∈ R to is+1.
Note that is+1 is the representative of coalition T
is+1 ⊆ N\S, although T is+1 could
contain is+1 solely if is+1 failed to have his oﬀer be accepted by is+2.
If is+1 rejects z
is
is+1
, then the game ends with both sides, S and T is+1 , staying apart.
If is+1 accepts z
is
is+1
, then is pays z
is
is+1
to is+1 so that the coalition S∪T is+1 is formed.
Hence, the game ends and is ﬁnally receives v(S ∪ T is+1) − zisis+1 −
∑
j∈S\{is} b
is
j −∑
j∈S\{is} x
is
j +
∑n
k=s+1 b
ik
is
and is+1 ﬁnally receives z
is
is+1
−zis+1is+2−
∑
j∈N\{is+1,is+2,...,in} b
is+1
j +∑
l∈{is+2,...,in} b
l
is+1
.
11
Stage 5b: Player is−1 makes an oﬀer z¯
is−1
is
∈ R to is. Here, dependent upon the result at
stage 4, is can be an individual player or a representative of T
is+1 ∪ {is}.
Theorem 3.4 For any superadditive game (N, v), the SPE outcomes of Mechanism C
coincide with the payoﬀ vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley value.
Proof
Duality again plays a key role here and the proof proceeds in a similar manner of Theo-
rem 3.2. Hence, we only present the crucial part of the proof below.
Due to superadditivity, it is obvious that in equilibrium all rejected proposers will form
into a coalition. That is, any rejected proposer ik will oﬀer y
ik
ik+1
= v(T ik+1) to ik+1, and
consequently, the coalition is gradually expanded until N\S is formed before is makes a
renegotiation oﬀer to is+1 who is the representative of N\S. Therefore, at stage 5a, the
best response for is is to oﬀer z
is
is+1
= v(N\S) to is+1. Consequently, in equilibrium, the
amount of payoﬀ that players in S are actually bargaining for equals v(N)− v(N\S).
Thus, if an oﬀer made by is can be accepted by players in S\{is} at stage 3, it neces-
sarily requires the sum to be no less than v(N) − v((N\S) ∪ {is}). Next, by oﬀering
zisis+1 = v(N\S) to is+1 as speciﬁed above, is receives v(N)− (v(N)− v((N\S) ∪ {is}))−
v(N\S) = v((N\S)∪ {is})− v(N\S) at stage 5a. On the other hand, if is was rejected at
stage 3, he will become the representative of (N\S) ∪ {is} at stage 4 in equilibrium (due
to superadditivity), and (also) receives v((N\S) ∪ {is})− v(N\S) at stage 5b.
Comparing the above two cases, we can see that is is indiﬀerent between making an oﬀer
be accepted or rejected by S at stage 3. Consequently, we know that all SPE will be in the
following format, i.e., it does not matter whether a proposer is makes an oﬀer be accepted
or rejected at stage 3.
At stage 1, each player i ∈ S announces bij = ϕj(S, vd|S)−ϕj(S\{i}, vd|S\{i}) for every
j ∈ S\{i}, where (S, vd|S) is deﬁned by vd|S(T ) = v(N)− v(N\T ) for all T ⊆ S.
At stage 2, a proposer, player is, can make any oﬀer x
is
j ∈ R to every j ∈ S\{is}.
At stage 3, any player j ∈ S\{is} accepts any oﬀer which is greater than or equal to
ϕj(S\{is}, vd|S\{is}) and rejects any oﬀer strictly less than ϕj(S\{is}, vd|S\{is}).
At stage 4, is makes an oﬀer y
is
is+1
= v(T is+1) to is+1. And is+1 accepts an oﬀer
yisis+1 ≥ v(T is+1) and rejects it otherwise.
At stage 5a, as the representative of S, is oﬀers z
is
is+1
= v(T is+1) to is+1, while is+1
accepts any oﬀer greater than or equal to v(T is+1) and rejects it otherwise.
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At stage 5b, as the representative of T is , is accepts any oﬀer z¯
is−1
is
≥ v(T is) from is−1
and rejects it otherwise, while is−1 oﬀers z¯
is−1
is
= v(T is).
Thus, the ﬁnal payoﬀ to is, independent of the acceptance or rejection of his oﬀer at stage
3, equals
v((N\S) ∪ {is})− v(N\S)−
∑
j∈S\{is}
bisj +
n∑
k=s+1
bikis
= v((N\S) ∪ {is})− v(N\S)−
∑
j∈S\{is}
(
ϕj(S, v
d|S)− ϕj(S\{i}, vd|S\{i})
)
+
n∑
k=s+1
(
ϕis(N\{ik+1, ..., in}, vd|N\{ik+1,...,in})− ϕis(N\{ik, ..., in}, vd|N\{ik,...,in})
)
= v((N\S) ∪ {is})− v(N\S)−
(
v(N)− v(N\S)− ϕis(S, vd|S)
)
+(v(N)− v((N\S) ∪ {is})) +
(
ϕis(N, v
d)− ϕis(N\{is+1, ..., in}, vd|N\{is+1,...,in})
)
= ϕis(N, v
d) = ϕis(N, v).
For those who are not chosen as a proposer, it is obvious to see that their ﬁnal payoﬀs are
equal to the Shapley value of (N, v). 2
Based on the SPE strategy proﬁle provided above, we like to highlight an intrigu-
ing feature of this mechanism: The Shapley value can be realized as an SPE outcome
in the very beginning of the game (where at stage 2 the ﬁrst proposer in oﬀers x
in
j =
ϕj(N\{in}, vd|N\{in}) to every j ̸= in), or at any time later (e.g., after all players is+1, ..., in
have been rejected, is makes an oﬀer be rejected at stage 3 and further acts according to
the strategy speciﬁed above). Hence, the mechanism allows players to go through the en-
tire equilibrium path without necessarily stopping at the beginning of the game, while the
Shapley value can be retained. This further shows that, even with the condition of strict
superadditivity, unlike in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), the SPE strategies of the
above mechanisms are not unique despite their outcomes are the same. The Shapley value
can be realized in an SPE where no renegotiation is actually played, or can be reached in
an SPE where a proposer made his oﬀer be rejected but later ‘successfully’ played at the
renegotiation stage.
As one can see, the only technical requirement we adopted to obtain the above results
is the strict superadditivity on TU environment. One may wonder whether we can relax
this assumption to an arbitrary TU game, like the way adopted in Pe´rez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2001) by using the Shapley value of the superadditive cover of the game. The
answer is no because the superadditive cover does not necessarily rule out equality relations
between the values of coalitions, which might lead to unacceptable oﬀers looking for higher
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payoﬀs from the renegotiation stage rather than the formation of the grand coalition.
On the other hand, if a TU game is such that its superadditive cover satisﬁes the strict
superadditivity, then all the above results will hold.
4 Concluding remarks
The paper aims to develop new insights in strategic coalitional bargaining, and to push
forward this research with a fresh treatment in modeling, where players are allowed to
further negotiate and form coalitions after they were rejected in the ﬁrst instance. This
more realistic setup shows a certain robustness of the Shapley value in non-cooperative
bargaining. One more original aspect lies in the use of the self-duality of the Shapley value,
which plays a key role in proving the main results of the paper. This follows the spirit
of the Nash program as we can better understand an axiomatic property by discovering
its relevant strategic features. Moreover, as we can see from the above mechanisms (see
especially the comment after Theorem 3.4), allowing options for rejected players to further
negotiate and form coalitions is not only interesting in restoring the Shapley value per se,
but also helps to yield the Shapley value in a much more ﬂexible manner: many more SPE
can emerge and they do not require immediate acceptance at the beginning of the game.
Regarding the renegotiation protocol, one may naturally ask a question: Why not
simply let the rejected proposers play again the bidding stage and oﬀer stage, like the
incumbent players do? The reason is that such a construction may lead to endless repetition
without a proper stopping rule of the game. One can of course deal with this issue by
introducing a discount factor or breakdown probability, which will end up in a similar
situation to the one studied in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). Hence, without modeling with
a discount factor, the rejected players should organize themselves in a diﬀerent bargaining
rule from that for the incumbent players so that the entire bargaining can stop properly.
And this does not seem far from reality. After all, two organizations rarely use identical
rules.
Finally, for future research, the renegotiation idea of the paper may be useful for one
to construct non-cooperative bargaining protocols for other self-dual solution concepts.
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